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HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES OF TCAS: A SIMULATION-BASED STUDY
Cabon, P. ; Rome, F. ; Favresse, A. ; Mollard, R.
Unité d’Ergonomie - LAA University Paris 5 - Paris, France
Figarol, S. ; Hasquenoph, B. ; Houvenagel, C.
DSNA1 - SDER- Sub Directorate for Studies and Research - Toulouse, France
Since its introduction in the 90’s, TCAS II, presented as a straightforward and very reliable technological tool, has
significantly reduced the risk of collision. Paradoxically, the introduction of this system has been accompanied with
numerous incidents and one major accident in 2002, mainly due to unclear rules, poor air-ground cooperation and poor
human decision. In order to investigate these potential human factors issues, a part-task air-ground simulation was
conducted: 10 pilots and 10 controllers were involved in the simulations of 4 scenarios containing TCAS occurrences.
Data collected included video camera recordings for behavioral analysis, Heart Rate (HR) for stress evaluation,
questionnaires and debriefings for perceived risk levels and situational awareness assessment. The observations and
errors were analyzed through the CREAM methodology. The debriefings were led through a self-confrontation
technique, together with pilots and controllers. Results show that the simulations of TCAS situations were able to
produce a significant physiological stress response with significant increase of HR when a resolution happens.
Questionnaires and debriefings show that, in most of the observed cases, aircrew, and controllers are not sharing the
same mental picture of the involved traffic and the risk of collision. This raises important issues in terms of
cooperation between controllers and aircrews in such demanding occurrences. This should allow identifying risky
situations and the related generic causes. The results will be discussed, aiming at a potential improvement of the
system, in terms of Human Machine Interface, training and consistency of procedures.
Introduction
The prevention of mid-air collision has been a major
safety issue in aviation for years. Since its introduction in
the 90’s, the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System II (TCAS II), presented as a straightforward and
very reliable technological tool, has significantly reduced
the risk of collision. The latest version, TCAS II Version
7 was built upon lessons learned from TCAS II use and
problems (Wickens, 1992) TCAS II is now a mandatory
device for all commercial aircraft with more than 19
passengers seats. This system issues two types of alerts :
the Traffic Advisory (TA) which identifies a traffic as an
intruder whose position should be closely monitored (but
no actions are required for the aircrew) and the
Resolution Advisory (RA) that recommends a vertical
escape maneuver to maintain a self separation.
Paradoxically, the introduction of this system has and
still contributes to severe incidents and was the main
cause of one major accident, the mid-air collision
between a B757 and a Tupolev at Uberlingen Lake in
2002. The major cause of this accident lies in the
decision of the Tupolev captain to follow, (accordingly to
his company’s manual), the Air Traffic Controllers
(ATC) instruction to immediately initiate a descent
though it was contrary to the RA order (BFU, 2004).
Even if an improvement seems to show up over the last
years mainly due to aircrew and Air Traffic Controllers
(ATCO) drastic changes in information and training
1

(Powell and Baldwin, 2002) it is still observed cases
where aircrews failed to follow the RA or over-reacted or
simply disregarded the alert. Obviously, this system still
raises many human factors issues that directly impair air
safety. A preliminary study (Cabon et al, 2003)
conducted by means of collective and individual
interviews of controllers and pilots emphasized the
following issues: stress, man-machine interface, training,
airline procedures and aircrew-ATC communications.
The present study aims to investigate the potential human
factors issues in an air-ground simulation. The use of
simulation is essential as the previous studies emphasised
the need to reproduce in real time the temporal pressure
and the stress that experience both pilots and ATCOs
during a TCAS sequence.
Method
Simulation Settings
All the simulation settings were designed by the Centre
d’Etudes de la Navigation Aérienne (CENA) in
Toulouse (France).The three main elements were:
•
An Airbus A320 part-task simulator including for
both the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot Non Flying
(PNF), the main displays and tools that are needed to
present and respond to a TCAS resolution: the
Navigation Display (ND), the Primary Flight Display

Previous name was CENA (Centre d’Etudes de la Navigation Aérienne), which is part of DSNA.
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(PFD), the Flight Control Unit (FCU) and a side stick.
Radio communications with ATC are available.
•
An ATC position with the 2 radar displays and
paper strips for the planning and executive controllers.
•
A “pseudo-pilots” position where 2 experts play
the role of the surrounding traffic. The ATC did not
know during the simulation what aircraft was actually
“piloted” or “pseudo-piloted”.
The main and most valuable feature was the integration
of the actual TCAS software and HMI in the cockpit
simulator and for the other simulated aircraft.
Scenarios
While high technical fidelity was out of scope,
operational aspects were taken as important. For this
study, 4 scenarios have been especially designed. The
first one (Biarritz) was designed by the CENA to induce
a high probability to trigger a TCAS alert. In this
scenario, always presented first, neither the ATCOs nor
the aircrews knew that the study was dealing with
TCAS operation. The three other scenarios (named
respectively Marseille, Orly and Reims) were based on
real incidents that were selected in collaboration with
the CENA and the Service du Contrôle du Trafic Aérien
(SCTA). In these scenarios, the ATCO were asked to
“play a part”, reproducing certain errors in order to
induce a conflict likely to trigger a TCAS alert. Each
scenario lasted between 10 to 15 minutes.
Participants
A total of 10 A320/330/340 pilots (i.e. 5 aircrews) and
10 ATCOs (ACC and APP) were involved in this study.
At the beginning of each session, none of the
participant knew the precise scope of this study, in
order to avoid anticipation or preparation effects.

aspects that were relevant to understand how they had
perceived the scenario and the TCAS sequence.
•
Heart rate (HR). In order to get an objective
measurement of stress, heart rate was continuously
recorded during the scenario by means of a digitized
recorder (Vitaport, Temec ®).
•
Collective debriefing. The aim of the debriefing
was to collect the verbalization of both pilots and
ATCOs on what happened during the scenarios. The
debriefing was supported by an auto-confrontation
using the video and communication recordings. This
debriefing was very useful to assess the situational
awareness of participants. It also allowed revealing
their a posteriori understanding of the situation, in
relation to the ASR or reports they would have to fill
in. At the end, a discussion was set up about the main
safety-related issues and suggestions to reduce risk in
operational environment.
Each session lasted one day from 0900 to 1730. The
four scenarios were played in the morning while the
afternoon was dedicated to the collective debriefing.
Results
Descriptive Analysis
TCAS Events
During the study, 20 scenarios have been played (i.e. 4
scenarios X 5 days). Both the simulation setting and the
scenarios were efficient to induce a significant number
of TCAS events allowing the data analysis. The
following TCAS events occurred during the
simulations:
•
8 TA not followed by a RA,
•
18 sequences TA/RA (some with several RA),
•
37 RA (initial and sense reversal or weakening RA).
A rather good variability of RA was obtained, with a
majority of Adjust Vertical Speed which are known to
be often misinterpreted by aircrews.

Data Collected
Four kinds of data were collected:
•
Direct observations and video of both working
positions to trace displays, events, actions and
communications to subsequently analyze behavior.
Specific observation grids were developed using the
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998). On top of this, one of the
observer was a fully qualified pilot able to pinpoint fine
details not caught by the video. Two Human Factors
experts also observed aircrew and ATCO.
•
Subjective assessment. After each scenario,
participants were asked to fill out questionnaires to rate
their situational awareness, their stress and various

Heart Rate (HR)
Stress was objectively measured in this study using a
continuous recording of HR. As there is a considerable
inter-individual variability in HR, all the data are
expressed as the percentage of variation of the 1st
percentile of the total recording (reference). Figure 1
shows an example of HR recording for a pilot and an
ATCO during a TCAS sequence.
This example shows a clear physiological reaction to
the occurrence of the different TCAS events for the
pilot and the ATCO. For the pilot HR increased
dramatically after the TA up to 80% when the two first
RA “Climb” and “Adjust Vertical Speed” are issued.
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Figure 1. HR expressed as a percentage of the
reference (1st percentile of the total recording) during a
TCAS sequence for one pilot (PNF) and one ATC
Then, HR progressively decreased even with the two
subsequent RA suggesting an adaptation of the
physiological stress to the situation. The level returns to
the initial level (around 30%) after the “Clear of Conflict”
announce. For the ATCO, HR increased progressively
after the STCA and reached a maximum (>60%) after the
TCAS and airprox reporting by the aircrew. In most of the
simulations, a similar pattern was observed with some
variability in the magnitude of variations. This result
confirms that, even in a part task simulator, the scenarios
and the environment are able to induce a significant stress
effect. In some cases, stress induced changes in behaviour.
In one simulation, after the aircrew had solved a multiple
RA sequence, a second TA appeared while the crew was
resuming normal navigation. This TA was not detected by
the aircrew, and even during the auto-confrontation they
had difficulties to recognize this event. This suggests a
“post-stress” or a “slacking” effect that reduced the
available resources of the crew. A systematic analysis is
being carried out on the relationship between physiological
manifestations of stress and some behavioural changes that
occurred during the simulations.
Thematic Analysis
From the data collected, two topics have been selected
as relevant from a Human Factors and operational point
of view:
•
situational awareness,
•
aircrew-ATCO cooperation and communications.
Situational Awareness (SA)
SA has been analysed regarding four main issues:
•
data collection,
•
timing of the TCAS sequence,
•
control over the situation,
•
common perception of conflicts by aircrew and ATC

Data collection. Since its introduction, TCAS has
introduced a major change in the perception of traffic
situation by aircrew. In fact, surrounding traffics are
continuously displayed on the ND (CDTI). Therefore,
aircrews now try to build an overall picture of the
traffic situation based on this information while in the
past this was only done through the hearing of the ATC
communications (party line). This may impact the R/T
communications, even before the TCAS issues an alert.
The following examples of aircrew messages to the
ATC during the simulations were recorded before and
during TA’s (most are translated from French):
•
Before a TA : “we’ve got a traffic”, “we’ve got an
aircraft”, “traffic TCAS”, “you’ve got a traffic
information ?”.
•
During a TA : “we’ve got a TCAS”, “TCAS alert”,
“we’ve got a visual”, “we’ve got a visual TCAS” “we
have it on TCAS”
These messages were intended to ask for traffic
information or were an answer to an ATC clearance or
a traffic information given by the ATC. They are not
covered by any procedure or rule and may interfere
with the ATC work and induce misunderstanding. For
example, the word “visual” may be understood by the
ATC as “I have a visual contact on the traffic” or
“Traffic TCAS” can be understood as “we’ve got a
RA”. The display of traffic on the ND may also lead to
false interpretation. For example in the Orly scenario all
pilots have seen the traffic as the aircraft ahead on the
approach, which was not the case. This
misinterpretation has a direct impact on aircrew SA and
may lead to incorrect maneuver in case of RA (as it
happened in the real situation).
The timing of the TCAS sequences. The analysis of
TCAS sequences reveals a large variability in the timing
of the TCAS events. In this study, the duration of TA
varies from 2 sec to 38 sec. In one case, a RA occurred
without being preceded by a TA. The collective
debriefing showed that most participants are not aware of
this large variability. The absence of TA leads to a
situation where the aircrews could not be properly
prepared to respond to the RA. In this case, the procedure
which is normally followed after a TA in most airlines
(the captain announcing “I (or you) have the control”,
switching off the Flight Director) cannot be applied. The
high unpredictability of the TCAS sequence impacts SA
as prevision and anticipation play a major role in the
building process of SA (Endsley, 1998).
The control over the situation by the aircrew. After
each scenario, the participants were asked to rate how
difficult it was to evaluate the situation and whether
they felt they started to loose the control over the
situation. Table 1 shows the results of these questions.
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Did you find difficult to PF
assess the situation ?
PNF
Did you felt that you were PF
losing control of the PNF
situation ?

No
11
16
20
20

Yes
9
4
0
0

Table 1. Evaluation and control of the situation by the
aircrew
Results show that the feeling of a global situation
assessment is higher among the PNF than for the PF.
This can be explained by the fact that PF are mostly
focussed on the active following of the RA and are not
seeking to have an understanding of the situation. The
following statements of PF’s during the debriefings
confirm this attitude: “You cannot react according to
what you understand”,” I don’t know what happened”
“I do not remember to descend”, “I focused on the IVSI
[NB : where the RA is displayed on Airbus aircraft], I
do not look at the ND”. During the debriefing, most of
pilots stated that the RA TCAS are too unpredictable
and that it is preferable to concentrate on the execution
of the manoeuvre. In this context, they do not expect or
seek traffic information from the ATC.
Common perception of conflicts by aircrew and
ATC. One of the most striking results from the
collective debriefing was the large shift in the
perceptions of ATCOs and aircrews on the same
situations. The auto-confrontation of the participants
with the video recordings showed that most ATCOs are
not aware of how the TCAS is displayed in the cockpit.
Aircrews are also not informed about the ATC tools,
especially regarding the functioning of the STCA and
the characteristics of radar display (precision and
refreshment rate). This was confirmed by the results of
2 questions asked to the aircrews and ATCOs (Table 2).
These questions have been asked only for the Biarritz
scenarios where ATCOs were not aware of the aim of
study and did not expect the situation at all.
The most striking results are the large number of
negative answers (11 out 20) and the uncertainty of the
PNF (4 answers “don’t know” out of 5). This shift is
mainly due to the different and independent tools that
are used by ATCOs and aircrews, e.g. time shift
between STCA and TCAS. This leads to a lack of
common perception of the situation which may interfere
in the communication and cooperation between ATCOs
and aircrews in these demanding situations.

To the aircrew: Do you PF
think you had a PNF
common
perception
with ATCO?
To the ATCO: Do you ATC1
think you had a ATC2
common
perception
with aircrew?

No Yes Don’t
know
1
0
4
5
0
0

3
2

1
0

0
3

Table 2. Feeling of a common representation by ATC
an aircrew
The Aircrew-ATCO Communications
In this section, the main results regarding the
communications between ATCOs and aircrews are
reported. The results are presented both for the messages
from aircrew to ATCO and from ATCO to aircrew.
Aircrew notification The only way for the ATCO to be
informed of a TCAS resolution is through the
notification of the RA by the PNF. The airline
procedure provides only 2 messages, whatever the RA
issued: “TCAS climb” or “TCAS descend”. In this
study, for simple RA such as Climb or Descend, the
observed messages are consistent with the procedure
which is, in this case, clear and appropriate. For the
other RA a large variability of phraseology is used, with
sometimes some ambiguous. For example, some pilots
used the message “TCAS descend” to report an Adjust
Vertical Speed RA, although this RA always means a
decrease of vertical speed that may occur while the
aircraft is climbing. This raises the issue of the alert
“Adjust vertical speed” which does not give directly the
sense of the RA and, as a consequence, the way the
pilot can report it to the ATC.
ATCO instructions Since the accident of Uberlingen
(BFU, 2004) both aircrews and ATCOs are aware that
aircrews must follow their RA and that ATC should not
give any clearance to the aircrew. However, on the 5
scenarios that have been played where the ATCOs were
involved, 2 ATC clearances have been given to aircrew
who followed these clearances. In these two cases, the
ATC clearance was given because the ATCO was
trying to avoid a conflict with another aircraft. In one
case, the clearance happened while the ATCO thought
that the conflict is solved, for the other, the clearance
was compatible with the RA TCAS. The critical aspect
is that the initial RA could be followed by another RA
which may be incompatible with the clearance.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Cockpit

The results obtained in this study show that even a
partial simulation of tasks was able to reproduce TCAS
events, stress and behaviors that raise several human
factors issues that could not be revealed in incident
reporting. The simulation conditions enabled producing
the temporal pressure and stress that is inherent in the
TCAS sequences. The assessment method that was
developed for this study, gathering physiological
recordings,
observations,
verbalization
and
questionnaires showed its strength to detect and analyze
the critical human factors issues to be addressed in the
future. These issues have to be considered in the
aircrew-ATCO relation and not only at one level. To
summarize these issues, the TCAS sequences can be
represented as a “parenthesis” in the normal aircrewATC communication and cooperation (figure 2). This
figure depicts the several events and sequences that
follow one another. The upper part represents the TCAS
events occurring in the cockpit, the lower part the ATC
side and in-between the air-ground communications. As
it is shown, the effects of TCAS occur before the TA,
when a traffic is displayed on the ND. This leads to a
change in the communication with potential
interferences and disruptive effects as it was reported
earlier (Benhacène, 2001 ; Walsh, 1997). The
subsequent sequence starts when a TA occurs. This
period is critical for the aircrew as it is intended to
prepare them for a potential RA. One of the main issue
related to this period that was revealed by the study is
the very large variability of the timing of the sequence:
from very short (even in one case, with no TA) - which
does not allow the crew to apply the expected procedure
and be mentally prepared to react- to long periods
where the preparation can diminish progressively. As
airborne and ATC systems are independent, additional
interferences can occur at this moment due to the STCA
triggering which may induce actions from the ATCO.
When the RA occurs, a critical period is starting (T1).
As long as the aircrew has not reported the RA, the
ATC has no means to be informed that the TCAS has
issued an alert.
This creates a very sensitive situation where ATC may
still give clearances that can be very disruptive for the
aircrew. The reporting of the RA by the aircrew is
expected to open the parenthesis in the aircrew-ATCO
communications. However, as demonstrated by our
results the reporting is sometimes inexistent, late or
ambiguous. The “Clear of Conflict” (CoC) message
from the TCAS starts another critical period (T2). As
for T1, as long as it is not reported by the aircrew, the
ATCO is ignorant of the end of the RA. This raises a
transfer of liability issue between the aircrew and the
ATCO: who is responsible for the separation of

Apparition
of a traffic
on the ND

TA

Initial RA

Clear of Conflict

RA

Initial clearance

Return to clearance

T1

T2

RA TCAS

Clear of Conflict

Air-ground
communications

ATC

STCA

Figure 2. The parenthesis in the aircrew-ATCO
communications in the TCAS sequence
aircraft? The report of the CoC by the aircrew to the
ATC closes the parenthesis, the aircrew normally
returning to the initial clearance, and resuming normal
navigation (auto-pilot ON, flight director ON). As it
was shown in the results, these tasks and a potential
slack in attention due to the stress experience during the
RA may have potential impact in this period reducing
the attention on subsequent TA.
Most of participants (pilots and ATCOs) stated that this
type of simulation and common debriefing allowed
them to better realize the operational issues and
difficulties in these time-critical situations: some had a
clear understanding of TCAS and associated procedures
but no operational experience. They were surprised to
have performed away from their understanding under
time pressure and they noticed the consequences of
their action on the other’s job (ATCO or aircrew). So
this represents a step forward as far as training is
concerned into practice for the training process. Further
analyses of the data are currently conducted in order to
get a systematic analysis of errors.
A second round of simulations was conducted in
autumn 2004: some changes were applied to scenarios
in order to keep the ATCOs in their operational role.
This led to some new situations and opened some new
issues about these very short intensive periods. From
the whole results and discussions of both sessions,
some solutions will be suggested, which may reinforce
or question present studies related to TCAS
improvement. One of the most encouraging outputs is
the method that was used to tackle the human aspects of
the air-ground integration and could be use for the
evaluation of solutions such as the RA downlink
(Broker, 2004): it is a valuable complement to other
approaches that have already been conducted: incident
analysis, simulations involving only one side (RADE1,
2004), or field evaluations (Walsh, 1997). It may also
be a valuable complement to present training methods,
which does not require outstanding technical means.
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